

### 3. PEACE BUILDING STRATEGY

#### 3.1 Introduction

As explained in Chapter 2, the framework of strategic priorities, drawn from the crisis analysis, sets out 4 strategic objectives that together will assist the Government of Pakistan and its people to realise the PCNA vision.

The four Strategic Objectives (SO) are:

1. Build responsiveness and effectiveness of the State to restore citizen trust
2. Stimulate employment and livelihood opportunities
3. Ensure delivery of basic services
4. Counter radicalisation and foster reconciliation

The recommendations, in the form of outcomes (to produce) and outputs (to deliver to produce the outcomes) to meet these objectives are selected because they address the crisis drivers; they can and must be carried out sensitively to seize potential peace building opportunities *in the process* as well as in the final outcome. The three crosscutting themes of crisis-sensitivity, gender and capacity development enable this.

In addition the following principles have also guided the development of this strategy and must apply, also, in its implementation:

#### a) *Human Rights*

Peace and security, development and human rights are interlinked and mutually reinforcing. This strategy is underpinned by a rights based approach to effectively tackle the marginalisation of the inhabitants of FATA and KP. Such an approach transforms the individuals from objects of charity into subjects and actors of change with rights, entitlements and duties. Core human rights principles have guided the PCNA process and must permeate the implementation of activities. These principles include empowerment, non-discrimination, consultation and participation, access to diversified sources of information, transparency, accountability and addressing impunity. This approach will also help foster reconciliation.

#### b) *Access and Equity*

The State must strive to provide equitable and affordable services to all, irrespective of language, tribe, gender, religion or any other factor, which, in addition to reducing vulnerability (SO3), will contribute to stability in these communities. This will also counter militant propaganda (SO4) that claims to deliver speedier justice for example, but omits to mention that these services it improves are not necessarily available to all (such as education for girls).

This state responsibility for access goes beyond delivery of services and social protection; the State also needs to ensure that the inputs needed to grow the economy (energy, transport, infrastructure, security, a regulatory environment, (SO1 and SO2)) are also provided efficiently, cost-effectively and gender-sensitively.

In order to convince local people of their commitment, the GoKP and FATA Secretariat must ensure that changes and access are visibly improved at the local level.

*c) Community Participation*

Increased community participation in planning and implementation of interventions, combined with an increased sense of community share in the ownership of service facilities and community infrastructure will strengthen visibility of state concern for the people and hence rebuild trust in the Government (SO1). Strengthening community participation in service delivery, along CDD<sup>24</sup> principles, also opens opportunities for building greater social cohesion within communities (SO4).

Establishing civic oversight mechanisms to address corruption and mismanagement by the state is critical for the efficient delivery of basic services and for encouraging investment into the region (SO1 & SO2). Such mechanisms must make allowance for the special requirements that are a pre-requisite for women and girls to access services, as well as take into account the generally low levels of capacity in these areas. New systems and legislation will need to be developed to strengthen accountability and transparency of all state services, including security (SO1).

*d) Communication*

The State needs to improve its communication to communities so that they are more aware of available services, assistance packages, grants, credit, technical assistance and informed of ways to access them (all SOs). This is part of their rights. Past failure has fed perceptions, not necessarily founded, that large development budgets available to them have passed them by. The upshot is distrust and the sense that the state is not interested in public needs.

Centralised information collection and dissemination is required (SO4), including for grievance redress (SO1). Development of ICT<sup>25</sup> could help (SO1 and 2), but most critically the government must develop a comprehensive information strategy drawing on the different strands of the PCNA (SO4). This should include communication of commitment and values, planning of the approach, level and

<sup>24</sup> Community-driven development: approach focuses on channelling the flow of information and funds between communities and formal state institutions. Communities have a high involvement and oversee priority aspects of post-conflict development engagement.

<sup>25</sup> Information and Communication Technology

timing of the communication of the PCNA themes (such as mechanisms for greater participation), the sequencing of interventions, as well as develop targeted messages for specific audiences on local priorities and alternative approaches (such as child-to-child, SO3).

*e) Coordination*

Sector assessment and the PCNA strategy development have been informed by Government and other development strategies, such as the FATA Sustainable development Plan, Malakand Strategy and other national and international humanitarian, recovery, disaster response and development programmes. Coordination of the recommendations proposed with other initiatives is essential during implementation to foster synergies and economies of scale.

*f) Implementation*

The implementation of the strategy will likely require the set up of new structures and/or organisations and teams which can ensure timely implementation, monitoring and transparency and overcome low absorbency capacity in KP and FATA. Oversight and policy-level committees headed by very senior members of government must also be constituted for effective implementation. This is addressed in Chapter 4.

Flexibility is emphasised to allow for adjusting to evolving events. Reliable, frequent and close monitoring will be essential for early decision-making and risk management.

